ARBAC Policy for a Large Multi-National Bank by Jayaraman, Karthick et al.
ARBAC Policy for a Large Multi-National Bank
Karthick Jayaraman
Syracuse University
kjayaram@syr.edu
Vijay Ganesh
MIT
vganesh@csail.mit.edu
Mahesh Tripunitara
University of Waterloo
tripunit@uwaterloo.ca
Martin C. Rinard
MIT
mrinard@csail.mit.edu
Steve J. Chapin
Syracuse University
chapin@syr.edu
November 6, 2018
Abstract
Administrative role-based access control (ARBAC) is the first comprehensive administra-
tive model proposed for role-based access control (RBAC). ARBAC has several features for
designing highly expressive policies, but current work has not highlighted the utility of these
expressive policies. In this report, we present a case study of designing an ARBAC policy for
a bank comprising 18 branches. Using this case study we provide an assessment about the
features of ARBAC that are likely to be used in realistic policies.
1 Introduction
This case study describes the design of an administrative role-based access-control (ARBAC) pol-
icy for a bank comprising 18 branches. We designed the ARBAC policy to meet the following two
goals:
1. Facilitate the business functions in each branch by appropriately provisioning roles to facil-
itate the tasks of each job position.
2. Enforce a separation of privilege (SOP) property to prevent collusive behavior in the execu-
tion of important job tasks.
The business functions and job roles used in each bank branch are based on an existing study.
Schadd et al. [3] describes a role-based access-control (RBAC) policy for an European bank branch.
We extend this policy into an ARBAC policy in two steps. First, we add 17 additional branches
with the same functions and job roles. This is because we limited our case study to 18 branches,
which is approximately 600 roles based on the number of roles in each branch. Second, we de-
signed can assign and can revoke rules for administering role assignment actions such that the SOP
property is enforced.
SOP is a key concern for financial institutions because they are required to enforce such prop-
erties either by regulators or to be compliant with standards such as ISO 9000 [2]. SOP has its
primary objective in the prevention of fraud or collusive behavior in crucial operations. Typically,
SOP is enforced by dividing tasks and privileges for executing an operation among multiple users,
and making sure that a single user cannot obtain all the privileges necessary for independently
completing an operation.
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For example, let us consider that the Widget corporation wants to enforce a high level of trans-
parency in the processing of purchase orders. To meet this objective, Widget splits the purchase
order transaction into two tasks, namely creation and approval. The permissions for the tasks are
assigned such that junior level employees have the ability to create purchase orders, but only the
division’s manager can approve the purchase orders. Formally, the SOP constraint for this exam-
ple can be stated as, 〈 { Creation, Approval}, 1 〉, which means that a user can at most have one
role from the set { Creation, Approval}.
This case study illustrates how SOP constraints can be enforced by using a well designed
ARBAC policy. Three features of ARBAC, namely disjunctions, positive preconditions, and mixed
roles, are useful in expressing the SOP constraints. This case study illustrates how these features
are used in the policy. These features are complexity sources with respect to analyzing these
policies for safety. Therefore, use of these features makes the automatic analysis of ARBAC policies
harder. However, because of the utility of these features in enforcing properties such as SOP, we
envision that realistic policies will take advantage of these features.
This case study also describes how to formulate safety queries for verifying properties of the
policy. Formally, a safety query is a tuple of the form 〈 u, r 〉 that questions whether a user u can
be assigned to a role r. Several questions about the policy can be formulated as one or more safety
queries [1, 4]. We illustrate this with examples of safety queries for verifying the SOP property.
Model checkers could be used for verifying these safety questions prior to deploying the policy.
The remainder of this case study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the roles and the
role hierarchy in the policy. Section 3 describes the design of the can assign and can revoke rules.
Section 4 describes how to formulate analysis questions. Section 5 provides a summary.
2 Roles and Role Hierarchy
The bank comprises 18 branches. Each branch in the bank has 33 roles that are spread over four
business divisions, namely financial analyst (FA), share technician (ST), office banking (OB), and
support e-commerce (SE). Table 1 contains the list of roles in each branch and Figure 1 contains
the role hierarchy. There are eight roles per business division, comprising the following:
1. A role for each business division from which all the other roles in the business division
inherit. For example, all the roles in the FA business division inherit from the FA role.
2. Two managerial roles. For example, FA-HOD and FA-GM are managerial roles in the FA
division.
3. Five non-managerial roles. For example, FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, and
FA-Clerk are non-managerial positions in the FA division.
Each branch has a role called employee, from which all other branch-specific roles inherit. Each
branch has the same set of roles, leading to 594 roles in the bank policy comprising 18 branches.
In each branch, the five non-managerial roles in each business division have a separation of
privilege constraint such that a user may not be assigned to more than 3 roles of the five roles. For
example, FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, and FA Clerk are the five junior roles in the
FA division. A user who is already assigned to one of these roles can be additionally assigned to
at most 2 roles out of the remainder four roles.
Our policy assumes separate administration, which implies that administrative roles are not
managed by the same set of rules that apply to the regular roles. We have a single role named Ad-
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Function Position Role
1. Financial Analyst Head of Division FA-HOD
2. Financial Analyst Group Manager FA-GM
3. Financial Analyst Specialist FA-Special
4. Financial Analyst Assistant FA-Asst
5. Financial Analyst Senior FA-Senior
6. Financial Analyst Junior FA-Junior
7. Financial Analyst Clerk FA-Clerk
8. Share Technician Head of Division ST-HOD
9. Share Technician Group Manager ST-GM
10. Share Technician Specialist ST-Special
11. Share Technician Assistant ST-Asst
12. Share Technician Senior ST-Senior
13. Share Technician Junior ST-Junior
14. Share Technician Clerk ST-Clerk
15. Office Banking Head of Division OB-HOD
16. Office Banking Group Manager OB-GM
17. Office Banking Specialist OB-Special
18. Office Banking Assistant OB-Asst
19. Office Banking Senior OB-Sr
20. Office Banking Junior OB-Jr
21. Office Banking Clerk OB-Clerk
22. Support E-Comm Head of Division SE-HOD
23. Support E-Comm Group Manager SE-GM
24. Support E-Comm Specialist SE-Special
25. Support E-Comm Assistant SE-Asst
26. Support E-Comm Senior SE-Sr
27. Support E-Comm Junior SE-Jr
28. Support E-Comm Clerk SE-Clerk
29. Financial Analyst - FA
30. Share Technician - ST
31. Office Banking - OB
32. Support E-Comm - SE
33. Branch Employee - Employee
Table 1: Roles Derived from Function and Official Positions
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SE-HOD
SE-GM
SE-Special SE-Asst
SE-Senior
SE-Junior
SE-Clerk
SE
Employee
OB-HOD
OB-GM
OB-Special OB-Asst
OB-Senior
OB-Junior
OB-Clerk
OB
ST-HOD
ST-GM
ST-Special ST-Asst
ST-Senior
ST-Junior
ST-Clerk
ST
FA-HOD
FA-GM
FA-Special FA-Asst
FA-Senior
FA-Junior
FA-Clerk
FA
Figure 1: Role Hierarchy Design
min used for administering role assignments and revocations. Therefore, the Admin role appears
as a precondition in all the assignment and revocation rules.
3 Can Assign and Can Revoke Rules
We designed can assign rules to enforce the constraint that a user can be assigned to at most 3
roles out of the five non-managerial roles in each business division. This constraint can be stated
formally as,
〈 {FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, FA Clerk}, 3 〉
The can assign rules are designed to express the valid conditions for assigning a user to a par-
ticular role. The conditions specify the role memberships that are required for user to be assigned
to a role. To meet our SOP objective, we need to enumerate all the valid conditions that can en-
title a user to be assigned to each of the five non-managerial role. These conditions can then be
expressed as one or more can assign rules.
We illustrate the design of the can assign rules using an example. For example, let us consider
the FA-Clerk role. Table 2 contains the can assign rules for the role FA-Clerk. A user can be assigned
to the role FA-Clerk, under three cases:
1. Case 1: If a user is is not assigned to any other managerial role, then he can be assigned to
the FA-Clerk role. To express this condition, we created a can assign rule that contains FA as
a positive precondition and four negative preconditions for the other four non-managerial
roles.
2. Case 2: If a user is already assigned to a single non-managerial role, then the user may
be assigned to an additional non-managerial role. To express this condition, we need four
can assign rules. Each of these four rules will have 2 positive preconditions and 3 negative
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Admin Role Preconditions Target Role
1. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
2. Admin FA∧FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
3. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
4. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
5. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧FA-Junior FA-Clerk
6. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧FA-Senior∧FA-Junior FA-Clerk
7. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧FA-Junior FA-Clerk
8. Admin FA∧¬FA-Asst∧FA-Specialist∧FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
9. Admin FA∧FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧FA-Junior FA-Clerk
10. Admin FA∧FA-Asst∧¬FA-Specialist∧FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
11. Admin FA∧FA-Asst∧FA-Specialist∧¬FA-Senior∧¬FA-Junior FA-Clerk
Table 2: Can Assign rules for FA-Clerk Roles
preconditions. Of the two positive preconditions, one is for a business division role FA
and the other is one of the four non-managerial roles. The remainder non-managerial roles
appear as negative preconditions.
3. Case 3: If a user is already assigned to two non-managerial roles, then the user can be as-
signed to an additional non-managerial role. To express this condition, we need six can assign
rules. Each of the six rules have 3 positive preconditions and 2 negative preconditions. The 3
positive preconditions include the business division role and two of the four non-managerial
roles. The remainder non-managerial roles appear as negative preconditions.
As illustrated by Table 2, the can assign rules make use of disjunctions, positive preconditions,
and mixed roles. The valid conditions for assigning the FA-Clerk role is essentially a disjunc-
tion, in which each can assign rule is a disjunct. Also, several of the can assign rules have mixed
preconditions because they have both positive and negative preconditions.
We followed the same procedure for designing the can assign rules for all the other non-managerial
roles. The complete list of the can assign and can revoke rules can be obtained from our policy file1.
The can assign rules for the managerial roles were designed to enforce that a user assigned to
any of the non-managerial roles cannot be assigned to a managerial role. Therefore, assignment
rules for the managerial roles had negative preconditions for all the non-managerial roles and one
positive precondition for the business division role.
In our policy, all the roles are revocable. Therefore, we had 594 can revoke rules, one for each
role. We did not see any reason to make a branch-specific role irrevocable.
4 Analysis Questions
As mentioned earlier, several questions about the policy can be expressed as a safety query. We
illustrate how the following two analysis questions can be expressed as a safety query:
1. Can a user be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division in any of the 18
branches?
2. Can a user be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division in all the 18
branches?
1http://kjayaram.mysite.syr.edu/mohawk/Mohawk.html
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Both these questions can be encoded as a safety question of the form 〈u, targetrole〉 as follows.
To express these analysis questions as safety queries, we need to add some additional roles,
can assign, and can revoke roles. These additions do not affect the valid administrative actions for
the other roles described in the policy.
For each branch, we add two additional roles, i.e., we add roles AnyFouri and Branchi for each
branch. The objective of the AnyFouri is to identify if a user can be assigned to four non-managerial
roles. We add can assign rules for this role in each branch to express the condition that if a user is
a member of four non-managerial roles, then he may be assigned to this special role. The Branchi
roles help in the encoding of both safety questions, so we will refer to them as helper roles. The
can assign rules for each of the helper roles express the condition that if a user can be assigned to
either AnyFouri or Branch(i+1), then he may be assigned to Branchi.
To express question (1) as a safety question, we add a single can assign rule for targetrole that
is of the form 〈Admin, branch1, targetrole〉. The consequence of this rule is that If a user can be
assigned to targetrole, then it implies that a user can be assigned to four non-managerial roles in
at least one of the 18 branches.
To express question (2) as a safety question, we add a single can assign rule for targetrole that is
of the form 〈Admin, branch1 ∧ ..∧ branc18, targetrole〉. The consequence of this rule is that if a use
can be assigned to targetrole, then it implies that a user can be assigned to four non-managerial
roles in all the branches.
5 Summary
We illustrated the design of an ARBAC policy with the intent of enforcing separation of privilege
for a bank comprising 18 branches. The separation of privilege constraint that we have used is
emblematic of realistic concerns. Disjunctions, positive preconditions, and mixed roles are very
useful for encoding SOP constraints. The SOP constraints can be verified by designing safety
queries.
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